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investment decision. Hence, a better understanding of the investment strategy of multinational 
enterprises could be obtained by investigating their international network and, in particular, 
the sequential establishment of foreign affiliates. In addition, more emphasis should be placed 
on the shareholder (upstream) and corporate (downstream) structure when analysing location 
choices. Control patterns have become more complex through direct and indirect investment 
linkages, so that it is more difficult to identify the ultimate controlling owner(s) of a company. 
Moreover, the establishment of special purpose entities (SPEs), like holding companies or 
cash-pooling trusts, have transformed the corporate structure by separating financial 
transactions from real investment flows. Thus, the increasing complexity of international 
companies makes it necessary to establish a more sophisticated model of FDI activity.  
  9
that attracts most French FDI. Moreover, it is apparent that French first-time investors prefer 
regions that have a common border with France. In those regions French is often an official or 
major language e.g. in the Swiss cantons Vaud, Vallais, Neuch￿tel and Geneva or in the 
German regions Saarland and Baden. 
 
Figure 1.   Location choices of French first-time movers in 2004 (NUTS 3 level) 
 
 
  > 5 French affiliates    ≤ 5 French affiliates 
 
Table 1 provides a general overview of the geographical breakdown of French FDI in 2004. 
The majority (64%) of all French first-time movers establishes their foreign subsidiary in 
Europe whereas only 41% of all existing foreign establishments are situated in Europe. This 
pattern could imply that first-time movers start with European locations before settling in 
other regions of the world. Moreover, a mere 6% to 8% of all first-time investors choose a 
location in Central and Eastern Europe, North America or North Africa, whereas the total 
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where Xij includes location-specific variables like GDP per head and GDP growth and Wi 
includes firm-specific variables like turnover and age of the company. This model will be 
implemented as a conditional logit model by interacting company characteristics with four 
choice-specific dummy variables.
2   
 
 
3.  Data and Variables 
 
The firm-level data used in this paper is taken from AMADEUS (Analyse Major Databases 
from European Sources), a pan-European corporate database containing information on 
financial accounts, ownership structure and affiliated companies. The database compiles 
company accounts filed under legal obligations in European countries. The AMADEUS 
database release 88, 113 and 136 are used to determine the subsidiary status in the year 2000, 
2002 and 2004, respectively.
3 In the context of this paper French first-time investors are 
defined as French firms reporting foreign subsidiaries in 2004 but not in 2002 and 2000.
4 
Only French companies with a single, first-time FDI in 2004 are selected so that potential 
network effects and interdependencies between multiple foreign affiliates can be neglected.  
The final sample consists of 307 French first-time investors with subsidiaries across 45 
regions in 27 countries in Europe, North Africa and North America.
5 The complete postal 
address for European subsidiaries is usually available in AMADEUS, however outside 
Europe locational information is limited to the country code. Consequently, the location 
analysis for the worldwide sample is restricted to the country level (NUTS 0) whereas the 
European sub-sample also allows to estimate the effect of regional (NUTS 1) characteristics.
6  
Figure 1 provides a detailed overview of the spatial distribution of French first-time 
investments in Europe in 2004. Capital regions and large cities like London, Barcelona, 
Madrid, Lisbon, Warsaw, Luxembourg and the Rhein-Ruhr area are major recipients of 
French investments. In Italy, it is not Rome but Milan, the major city in the industrial North 
                                                 
2 Instead of interacting the firm-specific variables with all 27 countries or 45 regions, only four regional 
dummies (Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America and Maghreb) are created for the interaction. 
3 Changes in the subsidiary structure are not explicitly cited in the AMADEUS database, they can only retrieved 
indirectly by comparing the subsidiaries listed in the database at different points in time via the various data 
releases.  
4 First-time investors are not necessarily firms that have never invested abroad before but within the time period 
covered by the database (2000-2004) those firms have become engaged in FDI for the first time. 
5 In this paper North Africa includes the Maghreb countries Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. 
6 The NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) classification is the standard geographic code for 
the regional sub-division of a country. Up to 5 statisical levels exist. The NUTS 0 level corresponds to the 
country (e.g. Germany), the NUTS 1 level corresponds to the top regional subdivision (e.g. the 16 
Bundesl￿nder/federal states in Germany) and the NUTS 2 level is a further regional subdivision (e.g the 39 
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than for domestic company clusters. Other country-specific studies include Hungary (BØkØs 
2005) and Romania (Hilber and Voicu 2007). 
Taking the outward perspective, Mucchielle and Puech (2003) analyse location choices of 
French multinationals in Western Europe. They use a French agglomeration variable and 
obtain a positive and significant coefficient. They conclude that French firms preferably 
follow other French firms. While the clustering of firms could also result in dispersion forces 
due to diseconomies of scale like scarce resources and higher prices, empirically 
agglomeration economies seem to dominate dispersion forces on the national and regional 
level. The most interesting paper from a French perspective is the one by Disdier and Mayer 
(2004) who compare FDI location choices of French manufacturing firms in thirteen West and 
six East European countries between 1980 and 1999. They show that agglomeration 
economies are stronger in West European than in CEE countries, although the East-West 
divide appears to be decreasing over the study period. Other traditional explanatory variables 
like market size and institutional quality have a positive effect on French investors whereas 




Different econometric estimation methods can be used to model location choices. One of the 
most frequently used methods in this literature is the conditional logit (CL) model proposed 
by McFadden (1974). In the CL model only regressors that vary over the alternatives (here, 
locations) are used to predict the outcome that is chosen. A multinomial logit (MNL) model is 
used instead if the regressors, like company characteristics, do not vary over the alternatives. 
Both models can be combined in a so-called mixed logit model. The dependent variable in the 
mixed logit model is a binary variable that takes the value of one if a subsidiary has been 
established in a particular location and a value of zero otherwise. Under the assumption of 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which states that the probability ratio of two 
locations is independent of any other third location, the probability of choosing a particular 





















 ,    j = 1, ￿, m,    6
this traditional trade theory and introduces increasing returns to scale, trade cost, preferences 
for variety and imperfect competition (Krugman 1980). Most specifically, firm locations are 
endogenous. Profit-maximizing firms that face transportation cost are assumed to choose 
locations that enable them to serve many costumers directly. Yet, firms also prefer larger 
markets in order to reduce trade cost which in turn can lead to spatial agglomeration. In 
addition, the New Economic Geography (NEG) initiated by Krugman (1991) stresses the role 
of backward linkages like industrial input-output relations where the final product of one firm 
is an intermediate input of another firm in the same sector. Market demand becomes 
endogenous so that ￿agglomeration can form through a process of circular causation￿ (Head 
and Mayer 2004: 2612). 
The growing availability of firm-level data has facilitated the rapid expansion of the empirical 
literature on firm location choices in recent years. Empirical contributions can differ to a large 
extent, depending on whether the studies focus on inward or outward FDI flows, developed or 
developing countries, national or sub-national locations. The majority of papers analyses 
inward FDI flows and its spatial distribution within in a developed country. For instance, 
Crozet et al. (2004) study the location determinants of FDI in France. They find that investors 
with the same nationality tend to co-locate and that firms prefer locations close to their home-
market. Similar agglomeration patterns are found for Japanese investments in the US (Head et 
al. 1995) and Europe (Mayer and Mucchielli 1998). Numerous other studies have analyzed 
the location determinants of FDI within a particular country in Western Europe, including 
Italy (Basile, 2004), Portugal (Guimaraes et al., 2000), Ireland (Barrios et al., 2006) and the 
UK (Devereux et al., 2007).  
In contrast, the location of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has only recently 
received more research attention. Since the early 1990s the CEE countries have attracted an 
increasing amount of FDI. The collapse of the Soviet Union started a genuine political and 
economic restructuring process. With the prospective EU enlargement this transition process 
has intensified further. Undoubtedly, the accession of ten transition countries in 2004 has 
marked a new period for foreign investments in the CEE.
1 Pusterla and Resmini (2007) 
estimate the determinants of the location of foreign manufacturing plants in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania between 1995 and 2001. They find that already prospective 
EU membership has a positive effect on the site selection process. In addition, they confirm 
the importance of agglomeration forces and interestingly, the effect is stronger for foreign 
                                                 
1 On May 1, 2004, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia joined the European Union. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on  January 1, 2007.   
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EATR: Effective average tax rate 
FDI: Foreign direct investment 
GDP: Gross domestic product  
IIA: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
MNL: Multinomial logit 
NEG: New Economic Geography 
NUTS: Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics 
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 















































































































































' 23/' C/' 6=6<F
6 6

/'' C/' 6=6<F
=

 <'O"


56C"$7
C/' 6=6<F

 <'O"





-

C/' 6=6<F
$	
	

69
-



59-

9
3


'

9-


9
1	1	
5F2,V" 6=6<FV
H





3-<

-2

59-

9
3


'9


9
3

'

5F2,V" 6=6<FV
H




